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      ransnational, violent non-state ac-
tors operate in weak states for a number 
of reasons.  The most prevalent of these 
is the host state’s inability to sustain the 
basic requirement of statehood:  a mo-
nopoly on the legitimate use of physical 
force. When the monopoly of force is 
lost, violent groups establish reciprocal 
relationships with the relevant mar-
ginalized populations, allowing these 
actors to not only exist in weak states, 
but to thrive. Disenfranchised ethnic 
and political groups provide either tacit 
or active support and render transna-
tional, violent non-state actors able to 
establish illicit economies in order to 
fund their activities.
One violent non-state actor in par-
ticular, the Kurdistan Workers’ Par-
ty (PKK), found success in the 1990s 
launching cross-border attacks into 
Turkey from neighboring Iraq.  Clear-
ly Iraq’s loss of control over its sover-
eign territories made this possible, but 
to blame weak borders oversimplifies 
the politics; more moving parts were 
involved.   Three successive factors al-
lowed the PKK to operate from Iraq: 
the state’s loss of monopoly on legiti-
mate violence, the presence of margin-
alized populations, and access to illicit 
economies.   The academic theories of 
political scientists Boaz Atzili, Michael 
Klare, and Daniel Posner demonstrate 
that these factors contribute to the effi-
cacy of violent non-state actors residing 
in weak states in a broader sense. 
 
fied, but they also had few opportunities 
to be incorporated into Lebanese society. 
They were true outsiders and therefore eas-
ily rallied to support the PLO with whom 
they identified more readily than their host 
state. The PLO’s ability to act as a surrogate 
state in the absence of Lebanese state ser-
vices solidified the relationship between 
two groups whose identities and ideologies 
had already aligned.
At times, the alignment of marginalized 
groups with non-state actors is accelerated 
by the politics of the state.  For example, 
politics in Malawi have historically divided 
along ethnic lines, much like in Lebanon. 
Daniel Posner describes the historical cir-
cumstances in which this climate  devel-
oped as a result of antagonism between 
Malawi’s major ethnic groups, Chewas and 
Tumbukas. Malawi has a history of politi-
cal mobilization of ethnic groups, a prac-
tice that tends to marginalize particular 
populations relative to those in favor; the 
Tumbukas were intentionally marginalized 
under Chewa president Hastings Kamuzu 
Banda.   Although there is no evidence of 
the co-optation of the marginalized groups 
by transnational, violent non-state actors, 
one can imagine that, were a Tumbu-
ka-based insurgency to seek refuge from 
the Zambian state, they would find their 
presence welcomed among marginalized 
Tumbukas in Malawi.
 
In fragile states we find an almost formu-
laic pattern by which marginalized popula-
tions are forced to ally with transnational, 
violent non-state actors when the formal 
Monopoly on the Use of Legitimate Force
For a transnational violent non-state actor to move 
into a third party host state, that state must be weak 
in the most basic sense; it must be unable to main-
tain a monopoly on the use of force throughout its 
sovereign territories. This loss of sovereignty over 
territories distant from the capital, weak regulation 
of borders, and incapacity to maintain rule of law 
allows stateless groups to move into the country. 
These circumstances are necessary but not suffi-
cient for the proliferation of these groups, or for 
the success of their operations. It is simply the first 
of several conditions that create an ideal refuge for 
terrorist or guerrilla groups.
Boaz Atzili considers the lack of a monopoly of 
force a prerequisite of residence in a third-party 
host state as well, but looks deeper into the ways 
these actors take advantage of the lack of control 
the state has over its land and people.  He posits 
that the conventional wisdom on the vacuum of 
power in weak states is “grossly underspecified.” 
In order to supplement this dearth of understand-
ing, he explores several more specific facets of 
state weakness and their implications in regards to 
transnational, violent non-state actors.  This arti-
cle, on the other hand, argues that state weakness 
opens the door for violent non-state actors, but 
does not independently provide an environment in 
which these actors can flourish or even carry out 
their basic functions absent the marginalized pop-
ulations necessary for support and, subsequently, 
access to illicit economies.
In the case of the PKK, Iraq’s state weakness is not 
the sine qua non to the organization’s success. State 
weakness is, however, a precursor to the PKK’s de-
cision to utilize Iraqi territory in order to launch 
cross-border attacks into Turkey. While Northern 
Iraq is one of the few regions of the country with 
little violence, the Kurdistan Regional Govern-
ment (KRG), not the central government, holds 
a monopoly on force there.  Had the Republic of 
Iraq continuously controlled their northern ter-
ritories, the PKK would not have had the option 
to rally in the Zagros Mountains. Nevertheless, in 
their search for a refuge from Turkish forces, PKK 
leadership did not relocate their forces into neigh-
boring Armenia, Syria, or even Georgia, despite 
those states’ fragility. Clearly state weakness and 
the state’s lack of a monopoly on force is only one 
of the factors that influenced their decision to go 
to Iraq.
Marginalized Populations
Beyond the basic capacity of a transnational vio-
lent non-state actor to penetrate a state’s territory 
and seek sanctuary there, a second element is es-
sential to a violent group’s success:  the presence 
of a relevant marginalized population that is read-
ily co-opted into the violent actor’s cause.  Atzili 
cites the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon as the 
marginalized population essential to the opera-
tions of the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO); the parallels between the PLO and the PKK 
are undeniable in this respect. Palestinian refugees 
in Lebanon were not only displaced and dissatis-
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government is unable to offer them 
protection. In states where the central 
government lacks a monopoly on the 
use of force, fringe groups have few 
choices; they must either flee or seek 
protection from a secondary source. 
This is especially true for marginal-
ized groups who are excluded from 
state patronage networks. They must 
consequently build relationships with 
non-state actors and, as a result, are 
able to maintain some normalcy and 
a measure of control.   This type of 
alignment happens in Pakistan, where 
the residents of ungoverned tribal ar-
eas seek protection from the Pakistani 
Taliban, and in Colombia, where iso-
lated rural populations are protected 
by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC).
The PKK did, of course, find margin-
alized populations in Iraq, specifically 
the populations of Iraqi Kurdistan. 
Their affiliation, however, was never 
as straightforward as the PLO’s rela-
tionship with Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon. While the Kurds of North-
ern Iraq certainly were marginalized 
within their state and identified more 
with Greater Kurdistan than with the 
Republic of Iraq, they never depended 
on the PKK for the provision of ser-
vices or even protection from the state. 
Prior to the incursion of the PKK, the 
KRG was already home to political 
competition between rival Kurdish 
political parties (both of whom were 
willing and able to provide services 
where the state was lacking) and had 
its own Kurdish paramilitary units. 
What they were able to lend to the 
PKK was sympathy and, to an extent, 
legitimacy. As a consequence of the 
KRG’s autonomy, Iraqi Kurdistan’s 
support for the PKK fluctuated over 
time. Complicating this matter was 
the KRG’s dependence on Turkey for 
economic and political support. As a 
result, the KRG at times supported the 
PKK, even providing fertile ground 
for recruitment, and at times actively 
fought to expel them from Iraq.
Illicit Economies
Much of what can be gained from the 
support of local marginalized popula-
tions comes in the form of access to il-
licit economies. Indeed, transnational 
violent non-state actors need recruit-
ment and political support, but they 
also need funding and weapons.  
Michael Klare is an expert on illicit 
economies’ funding for transnational 
violent non-state actors.  In the book 
When States Fail, he describes the sys-
tem through which illicit commodi-
ties flow out of weak states and small 
arms flow in. He claims that paramil-
itary groups form on the basis of eth-
nic-political factions or are co-opted 
by marginalized groups once the mo-
nopoly on the use of legitimate force 
is lost.  The resident populations then 
aid the paramilitary groups in access-
ing illicit economic networks. These 
economies can be based on drugs, 
diamonds or human trafficking, but 
they must exist under the radar of the 
central government, an easier task in 
weak states than in strong ones. Ac-
cording to Klare, the system of ex-
change of illicit goods for light weap-
ons is dependent on state weakness 
and an environment of lawlessness 
in order to take advantage of and, in 
some instances, create the networks of 
illicit trade.
In many cases, marginalized popu-
lations removed from the patronage 
networks have already established 
illicit economies by the time foreign 
terrorist or guerrilla groups move in. 
Because weak states are often rife with 
corruption, those who fall outside the 
groups receiving preferential treat-
ment and the majority of the state’s 
resources may be forced to operate 
in the trade of illicit goods, or at the 
very least in semi-formal economies 
outside the sphere of state influence. 
Transnational, violent non-state ac-
tors simply use the populace they have 
co-opted into their cause as an entry 
point to these economies.
Still other groups bring illicit econo-
mies with them when they move in 
and exploit friendly, local populations 
for logistical assistance. This is the 
case with the PKK in Iraqi Kurdis-
tan. The group claims to acquire only 
weapons and funding from the Kurd-
ish diaspora in Europe, but it is widely 
believed that there is an illicit element 
to the flow of resources from Europe 
to Kurdistan.  The PKK was reported 
to facilitate 60-80% of the European 
drug trade in the mid-1990s, oversee-
ing the drug traffic between Central 
Asia and Western Europe.  Although 
this is not an endeavor the popula-
tions of Iraqi Kurdistan had previ-
ously undertaken, it is unlikely that 
such massive smuggling networks 
could be managed without their sup-
port if drugs and weapons do indeed 
move through the Zagros Mountains. 
Whether this support is an active 
economic exchange or merely willful 
ignorance of the PKK’s activities is a 
matter of debate.
Multiple Causes
State weakness, specifically the lack 
of a monopoly of the legitimate use 
of force, is not enough to support 
transnational, violent non-state ac-
tors in search of sanctuary. The loss 
of control over territories and other 
aspects of statehood are only the most 
basic attributes of a weak state that 
invite terrorist and guerilla groups in. 
More important to the success of these 
groups is the presence of relevant mar-
ginalized populations and the ability of 
those populations to provide the non-
state actor access to illicit economies. 
These economies can be either pre-ex-
isting as a result of state weakness or 
established by the violent non-state 
actor as a funding mechanism with the 
tacit or active assistance of the margin-
alized population.
The case study of the PKK and its in-
cursion into Iraq supports this mod-
el, albeit not as forthrightly as Atzili’s 
example of the PLO in Lebanon. The 
complex web of interactions between 
Iraq, Turkey, the PKK, the KRG and 
even political parties within the KRG 
make controlling for outside influence 
challenging and comparisons diffi-
cult to draw. What is clear, however, 
is that the PKK’s presence in Iraq is 
based upon more than the weakness of 
the Iraqi state; it is dependent on the 
sympathy and support of marginalized 
Iraqi Kurds and the help they can offer 
in utilizing illicit economies.
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